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Abstract
Members of worldwide parliaments partake in debates, where they have the opportunity to
hold governments to account by asking pre-submitted questions. The UK House of Commons
uses a ballot system to determine which members are selected to ask a question from those
who expressed an interest in doing so. This paper is the first in the literature to exploit this
randomization to show that the asking of such questions increases a member’s chances of being
reelected by their constituents.
It is shown that while the ordering of parliamentary questions is determined at random,
the practicalities of conducting debates introduce a potentially endogenous element to the de-
termination of which questions receive oral answers (particularly the speed at which questions
are answered). This paper uses a matched sampling approach to cope with such non-random
cases, but also includes alternative results, to show that the findings are not reliant on the use
of this technique.
1 Introduction
In the UK House of Commons, the daily agenda typically consists of one or more parliamentary debates.
These debates are usually focused on a particular government department, with the ministers responsible
for that department facing questions posed by other members. As well as simply finding out the answers
to their questions, such debates offer members the chance to hold the government to account for their
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policies, as well as raising awareness of particular issues. Alongside these objectives, this paper focuses
on the payoffs that members themselves can accrue by having their questions answered.
The present study exploits the institutional structure of the UK parliamentary system to create a
quasi-experiment. This approach means that this study can hope to infer a causal link between the act
of asking parliamentary questions and the probability of reelection
1.1 UK Parliamentary Questions Procedure
Since 1989, the order in which parliamentary questions are addressed has been determined by a random
ballot (Sandford (2012)). From the pool of submitted questions, those to be answered are drawn in
order, up to some pre-determined cut-off. This limit is chosen as the maximum number of questions
that could conceivably be reached during the time allocated to the debate, the current maximum being
25 questions. All these questions are placed on the ‘Order Paper’ for the debate, whereas questions not
drawn among this group are discarded.
The debate proceeds through these listed questions in numerical order, with each asking member
allowed one ‘follow-up’ question. The ‘Speaker’ presiding over the debate can also exercise some influence
over how many questions are reached on the Order Paper. In doing so, the Speaker faces a trade-off
between ensuring that each question is treated adequately, and ensuring that as many questions as
possible are given oral answers.
Given that the number of questions listed on the Order Paper is chosen as the maximum that could
potentially be answered during the time allocated to the debate, this debating process usually results
in a set of questions which are not reached, and therefore not given an oral answer in the House of
Commons. Such questions listed on the Order Paper but not reached during the debate itself are given
written answers.
There are various examples of international parliamentary systems that use random ballots to select
which questions are asked in parliamentary bodies, in the event that debates are over-subscribed (Canada
and Scotland, for example, use similar ballots). A key component of the UK system, and one that is
crucial to this analysis, is the recording of those questions not selected for direct oral answer. This
facilitates the construction of a comparable control group, against which the answered questions can be
compared.
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1.2 Oral Versus Written Questions
It can safely be assumed that Members of Parliament who listed questions for oral answer have an
interest in their questions being reached in the debate, given that the option of submitting questions
specifically for written answer is also available to them, with such questions always guaranteed to be
answered.
This can be stated more formally using an expected utility setting, where a member who would like to
ask a question in Parliament has the choice of submitting that question for oral or written answer. Both
are assumed to have the same cost (e.g. time and preparation), denoted c. All questions submitted
for written answer are guaranteed a written response, which can be assumed to offer the member a
guaranteed utility payoff Uw. This guaranteed payoff is assumed to make the member exactly indifferent
between submitting a written question and not doing so (Uw = c).
By submitting a question for oral answer, the member faces a probability p that their question will
be selected to go on the Order Paper. This implies a probability 1− p that the question is not selected
for the Order Paper, in which case their question receives no answer at all. This is assumed to offer
the member a payoff zero. If selected for the Order Paper, the question then has a chance q of being
reached in the debate. If the question is reached, it receives an oral answer, giving a payoff Uo, whereas
if it is not reached, it receives a written answer.
By choosing to submit an oral question in the first place, the member has revealed that their expected
payoff from doing so is greater than the cost of doing so, and also exceeds that of submitting a written
question. This means the following two conditions must hold:
p (qUo + (1− q)Uw) ≥ c
p (qUo + (1− q)Uw)− c ≥ Uw − c
Given that Uw = c, these participation and incentive constraints are effectively equivalent, and can
be rewritten as:
pUw + pq (Uo − Uw) ≥ Uw
Given that pUw ≤ Uw, the only way that this expression can be satisfied is if you have Uo ≥ Uw.
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Furthermore, if either p < 1 or q < 1, it must be the case that Uo > Uw. So, if there is either any
chance of not being selected for the Order Paper, or of the question not being reached in the debate, if a
member has submitted an oral question, it must be the case that the payoff to that member from having
their question answered on the floor of the House exceeds the payoff from having that same question
receive a written answer.
This paper takes the preferences described above as given, assuming throughout that members sub-
mitting questions for oral answer would prefer their questions to be reached in the debate, as opposed
to receiving a written answer.
1.3 Parliamentary Questions Literature
The political science literature includes many studies regarding questions submitted in Parliament.
Martin and Rozenberg (2012) list many international examples where data on parliamentary questions
has been used make inferences about the role of legislators and the impact that these questions may have.
Saalfeld (2011) uses questions submitted in the UK House of Commons during the 2005 Parliament to
examine whether MPs with “visible-minority” backgrounds are more likely to ask questions relating to
these minorities, finding in fact that the ethnicity of constituents plays a more prominent role. John and
Bevan (2011) consider trends in the types of questions asked during Prime Minister’s Questions between
1997 and 2008. Using Irish data, Martin (2011) also looks in detail at the content of questions asked in
Parliament, to assess to what extent questions are focused towards local as opposed to national issues.
Many studies have been conducted on the wider behavior of political representatives, such as their
parliamentary voting behavior. Cowley and Stuart (2008) and Cowley and Stuart (2009) are examples
which study such voting behavior in the UK case.
There is a wide literature in the area of voter responses to political behavior, even restricting attention
to the UK case. In one example, Sanders and Norris (2005) consider the effect of political advertising
on voter behavior. In another related paper, Sanders et al. (2007) consider the effectiveness of internet-
based surveys in predicting voter behavior.
There has been very little work in the political science literature, however, on the determinants of
the political success of legislators. An important reason for this, is that such studies face the problem
of distinguishing whether any correlation is caused by the characteristics of politicians themselves,
as opposed to their observed behavior. An exception is Loewen et al. (forthcoming), which uses a
natural experiment in the Canadian House of Commons to test whether political representatives who
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are chosen at random to propose legislation are more likely to achieve reelection. That study is therefore
complimentary to the one presented here, in that both exploit randomizations within parliamentary
institutions to reveal ways in which constituents reward certain behavior by their legislators.
To my knowledge, however, there is no study which uses the randomization process with which
parliamentary questions are chosen to make inferences about their effects. This may be a result of the
fact that in most international settings, the questions randomized out according to such processes are
discarded, making it impossible to use those cases as a comparison group. Furthermore, even in the UK
case there is no dataset available which records the answered and unanswered questions in one place.
This paper combines a number of different sources to conduct the analysis.
The use of this randomization forms the basis of all the findings reported in this paper. Under an
effective randomization, reported results cannot be attributed to self-selection into treatment or control
groups, which in turn means that all unobserved characteristics of the members that make up these two
groups should be equivalently distributed across the two groups.
1.4 Data Collection
The UK Parliament website lists the Order Papers for each day in the House of Commons since 27
October 1997.1 This translates to three full parliamentary terms, leading up to elections in 2001, 2005,
and 2010, with the exception of the first few months following the 1997 election.2 These Order Papers
contain all the questions listed for all the debates taking place on that day, in the order that they will
be addressed, as well as a numeric code, which is assigned to each question.
Alongside these Order Papers, the UK Parliament also publishes online transcripts for all the debates
which take place in the House of Commons on their ‘Hansard’ pages. These transcripts contain the
questions from the Order Paper that were actually asked when the debates took place. By combining
the two, it is possible to create a dataset which lists all the questions from the Order Papers, as well as
whether each of these questions was reached within the time allocated to the debate, in which case it
would have received an oral answer.
In 2010, the UK Parliament Library published a research paper containing a list of all Members of
Parliament, between 1979 and 2010. This paper is used to gather background data on MPs, including
1The Order Papers for two days, 15 July 1999 and 18 January 2002, are missing, but of a total of
1657 days over the time period in question, these represent just 0.12% of the dataset.
2The 1997 General Election took place on 1 May. Following the election, oral debates restarted at
the end of May, and continued through June and July. Parliament was then in recess until 27 October,
from which point Order Papers are available online.
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gender, age, party affiliation and ministerial positions. The dependent variable of interest (reelection) is
collected from datasets compiled by the UK Electoral Commission. In both cases, the data is matched
with the data on individual questions, based on constituency and member names.
1.5 Research Questions
This chapter will consider whether the act of asking parliamentary questions affects the reelection
prospects of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the UK House of Commons. If having a parliamentary
question successfully chosen to be answered orally in the House of Commons is valued by constituents,
this will be reflected in their voting behavior, and therefore the probability that the member is successful
in achieving reelection.
A second related research question involves the degree to which the selection of parliamentary ques-
tions can truly be considered as random. In particular it is necessary to ascertain whether the random-
ization in ordering questions is effective in offering all members who submit questions an equal chance
of having their question selected to receive an oral answer. Questions submitted by members who are
then absent from the debates are not answered, and questions that are submitted by more than one
member for the same debate are also treated altogether. Furthermore, the number of questions answered
during the debate will depend on the speed at which the debate progresses. As all these factors may
be non-random, it may be possible for members to circumvent the randomized nature of the debates to
influence the probability that their question receives an oral answer.
Any non-randomness in the allocation to treatment and control groups (i.e. whether the question
was reached during the debate) will have to be explicitly accounted for in the estimation methods that
follow.
1.6 Paper Outline
The next section of this paper will set the scene by using a simple ordinary least squares estimation
to determine whether members who have more questions selected for oral answer are more likely to be
reelected. Section 3 will then highlight some ways in which the randomized procedure by which questions
are selected to receive an oral answer could be undermined. Next, Section 4 will propose an alternative
estimation method, based on a matched-sampling approach, which aims to address the problems posed
by this endogeneity in the selection of questions to be given oral answers. Section 5 will provide the
results from some robustness checks and the final section will outline the conclusions of the study.
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2 Regression Analysis Based on Individual Members
2.1 A Basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Specification
The first method used will be to take each Member of Parliament over a parliamentary term as a single
observation, and count how many times that member was successful and unsuccessful in the ballot. The
hypothesis behind such a model is that if the selection of questions to be answered is indeed a random
one, then the inclusion of the number of unanswered questions in the regression would control for the
fact that members who ask more questions are likely to have particular characteristics, which may also
influence their probability of reelection.
In particular, once the total number of questions asked is controlled for, it is assumed that the number
of questions answered is effectively allocated at random, and is therefore exogenous in the regression
equation.
• i = 1, . . . , I is the set of Members of Parliament (MPs)
• t = 1, . . . , T is the set of elections for which data is available (2001, 2005, 2010)
• yit is a binary variable indicating whether member i was reelected in election t (dependent variable)3
• ait is the number of questions asked by member i in the lead-up to election t that received oral
answers
• sit is the number of questions submitted by member i in the lead-up to election t that did not
receive an oral answer (not reached during the debate)
• Xit is a set of other characteristics of member i in the lead-up to election t (party, age, gender)
• Eit is a set of dummy variables indicating which election followed the tabling of the question
• Cit is a set of dummy variables capturing constituency fixed effects
Using these definitions, the basic model can be written as:
yit = γ0 + γ1ait + γ2sit + γ3Xit + γ4Eit + γ5Cit + it
3Throughout this study, MPs who did not seek reelection are treated in exactly the same way as those
who were unsuccessful. There is likely to be some degree of endogeneity involved in members’ decisions
as to whether to stand for reelection, with those members who suspect they are unlikely to win being
disproportionately more likely not to stand.
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In this model, if two members i and j share the same characteristics (sit = sjt = s, Xit = Xjt = x,
Eit = Ejt = e, Cit = Cjt = c), including the number of unanswered questions, but member j has one
more answered question than member i, you have:
E [yit | a, s, x, e, c] = γ0 + γ1a+ γ2s+ γ3x+ γ4e+ γ5c+ E [it | a, s, x, e, c]
E [yjt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c] = γ0 + γ1 (a+ 1) + γ2s+ γ3x+ γ4e+ γ5c+ E [jt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c]
The change in the expected probability of reelection from having an extra answered question is then
given by:
E [yjt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c]− E [yit | a, s, x, e, c] = γ1 + E [jt | a+ 1, s, x, e, c]− E [it | a, s, x, e, c]
The assumption that questions are chosen at random to be answered from those on the Order
Paper implies that for any given combination of member characteristics and fixed effects, you have
E [it | a, s, x, e, c] ≡ E [it | s, x, e, c], which in turn implies that the effect of an increase in the number
of questions asked by a member can be identified simply by calculating the resulting change in the
probability of reelection, conditional on the number of unanswered questions:
γ1 = E [yjt − yit | s, x, e, c] = 4E [y | s, x, e, c]
Table 1 shows the results of regressions using such specifications, with standard errors clustered at
the member level. The first column in Table 1 includes no controls, and simply calculates the effect
of members having an extra question answered and unanswered on the probability of reelection. In
this simplest specification, with no controls, results suggest that members who have one more question
answered over the course of a parliamentary term have a lower probability of being reelected.
The second column shows the results of a similar specification, but in this case including dummy
variables to control for the parliamentary term for which the total number of questions has been cal-
culated. After including these dummy variables, a member who asks a higher number of parliamentary
questions is found to have a higher probability of reelection. Specifically, having an extra parliamentary
question answered is found to increase the probability of reelection by 0.18 percentage points. This is
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Table 1: Linear probability models estimating the effect of having an extra question answered in the
House of Commons on a member’s probability of reelection. The dependent variable is a binary variable
indicating whether the member was reelected in the following election (1 = ‘yes’, 0 = ‘no’), with mean
= 0.752 and standard deviation = 0.432).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Total answered questions -0.00209∗ 0.00176 0.00149 0.00140 0.00310∗
(-2.24) (1.64) (1.42) (1.45) (2.11)
Total unanswered questions 0.00485∗∗∗ 0.00115 0.000871 0.0000872 -0.00133
(6.04) (1.24) (0.94) (0.10) (-0.89)
Conservative Party 0.0991∗∗∗ 0.0715∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(4.44) (2.99) (3.09)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0398 -0.0259 0.111
(1.12) (-0.71) (0.74)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.108∗ -0.0882 -0.0622
(-2.02) (-1.68) (-0.39)
Changed party -0.334∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗ -0.196
(-3.73) (-3.04) (-1.27)
Ministerial position 0.0752∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(3.11) (3.56)
Age 0.0338∗∗ 0.0777∗∗∗
(2.88) (4.04)
Age squared -0.000387∗∗∗ -0.000842∗∗∗
(-3.39) (-4.70)
Years service -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0523∗∗∗
(-4.65) (-6.27)
Years service squared 0.000482∗∗∗ 0.000820∗∗∗
(3.34) (4.08)
Female -0.0796∗∗ -0.0183
(-3.16) (-0.25)
Election dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 1659 1659 1659 1659 1659
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.053 0.083 0.176 0.297
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all parliamentary questions over the parliamentary term, except the first few months of 1997 (see previous footnote)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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found to be very close to significant at the 10% level, with a t-statistic of 1.64.
Columns 3 and 4 introduce some extra control variables, first for the party affiliation of members,
and then for various other characteristics relating to seniority and gender. The introduction of these
extra control variables slightly reduces the size of the coefficient of interest, as well as the t-statistic.
Discussion of the other coefficients is kept to a minimum, as none benefit from the same type of
randomization as the one for answered questions, making it hard to infer causality. In short, members
representing the Conservative Party are found to be more likely to be reelected. This reflects a generally
increasing share of Conservative MPs in the House of Commons over the time-period covered here,
following Labour’s landslide victory in the 1997 election. Changing parties within an electoral term is
found to have a strongly negative effect on reelection prospects, as many voters presumably retain a
strong loyalty to the member’s former party (for which they were probably previously elected). Older
MPs and those with ministerial status are more likely to be reelected, but a longer period of service
reduces a member’s chances of reelection.
Column 5 includes the same set of control variables, and adds a set of dummy variables to control
for the constituencies that the members represent. The inclusion of these extra controls increases the
size of the coefficient associated with having an extra question answered to 0.31 percentage points. This
represents a large increase in the estimated coefficient, and is also associated with a t-statistic that
represents statistical significance at the 5% level.
2.2 Interpretation of Initial Results
The identification strategy pursued in this section reports a coefficient which calculates the effect of a
member asking one extra question during a parliamentary term. Among all the members in the sample,
Figure 1 shows that there are many members who ask no questions at all over the parliamentary
term. By contrast, however, the maximum number of questions successfully asked by a single MP in a
parliamentary term is 174, with a standard deviation of 19.98 questions.
The implied linear relationship reported in Table 1 therefore implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the number of questions successfully asked by an MP will result in a 6.2 percentage point
increase in the probability of reelection. This effect shows that not only is the effect statistically signif-
icant, but that it is also of sufficient magnitude to have a non-negligible impact on the probability of
reelection.
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Figure 1: Total answered questions for each member in each electoral term (mean = 15.38, standard
deviation = 19.98)
2.3 A Critique of the Basic Methodology
The method employed up to this point faces the potential criticism, however, that in certain debates
questions may be more likely to be answered than in others, in a way which violates the assumptions of
the model.
For example, if one particular government department evokes a lot of interest among members, it may
be that debates related to this department generate longer questions and answers, with more follow-
up questions from other members, and therefore proceed at a slower pace. In such debates a lower
proportion of listed questions will be answered than would be expected in other debates. If a member
has a particular interest in this department, they may submit a disproportionate number of questions
for answer in these debates. Such members would therefore be likely to see a high number of unanswered
questions, and a low number of answered questions. This would violate the assumptions of the model
above.
To address this problem, a matching-style method will be used, which in effect directly compares the
reelection outcomes of members whose questions received an oral answer, with the outcomes of members
who submitted a question to be answered in the same debate, but whose question was not reached in
the allotted time.
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3 Randomization In Practice
Throughout this paper, much of the analysis will exploit the fact that the ordering of questions, which
in turn determines which ones are asked, is determined at random. However, it is necessary to test the
degree to which this randomization process is effective.
3.1 Sources of Endogeneity in the Allocation to Treatment
Even with the knowledge that the ordering of questions is determined by a random draw, it is still
potentially possible for members with a particular interest in asking a question to influence their chances
of doing so.
The first way that this could be achieved is for more than one member to agree to ask the same
question. In such cases parliamentary procedure determines that the member with the first occurrence
of a question on the Order Paper asks the question, but that other members who submitted the same
question also have a chance to ask a follow-up question in the debate itself.
Clearly, not all cases where duplicate questions appear on the Order Paper are a result of this type of
collusion between members. If a subject is particularly topical at the time when questions are submitted,
it is also plausible to assume that members independently chose to submit the same question to the
minister responsible. Furthermore, some members have been known to complain that their questions
have been ‘grouped’ with others, when they considered the questions to be sufficiently distinct to warrant
separate treatment. Whatever the reasons behind such duplications, it is possible that their occurrence
is non-random, and therefore a system which treats such questions differently could have a non-random
allocation to treatment or control.
If a member is unable to attend a debate for which they have a question listed on the Order Paper,
then that question is not asked during the debate. Such non-attendance could be correlated with the
characteristics of members, as well as with their position on the Order Paper (later questions are less
likely to be reached), which means such absences could be non-random and also create an endogenous
element to the selection of questions to receive oral responses.
Another factor which could undermine the randomness of questions answered is the speed at which
the debate is conducted. Given that each debate continues for a fixed amount of time, the rate at
which questions are answered will in turn affect how many questions are reached among those listed
on the Order Paper. Any member taking part in the debate, and particularly the minister facing the
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questions, may be able to exert some control over which questions are reached. For example, a minister
may provide long-winded answers to earlier questions, in cases where they see many potentially hostile
questions from opposition party members further down the Order Paper.
The ‘Speaker’ in charge of the debate may also play a role in the speed at which debates are conducted.
The Speaker is an elected member of Parliament, who presides over debates in the House. The Speaker
has the authority to decide which (if any) members are able to ask supplementary questions related to
those on the Order Paper, aside from the questioner themself, and is charged with ensuring that the
rules of the House are upheld. On taking the role, the Speaker is required to sever all previous links to
political parties, to ensure their impartiality in the position.
As an unbiased member, the Speaker faces a trade-off between on one hand ensuring that questions
are answered fully, and on the other, ensuring that as many questions are answered as possible. Through
this influence, the Speaker could also potentially undermine the randomness with which questions are
selected for oral answer in the House of Commons.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics Comparing Answered and Unanswered Questions
3.2.1 Difference-in-Means Tests Based on the Complete Dataset
Table 2 compares the background characteristics of MPs among those questions that received oral
answers in the House of Commons, with those among the questions that were not reached during
debates, and therefore received written answers. The final column shows the results of t-tests looking
for statistically significant differences between the mean values of these characteristics between the two
groups. In this setting, all answered questions, duplicate or not, are treated in the same way, and
questions not asked because the member was not in attendance are treated exactly the same as all other
unanswered questions.
To be clear, given that the order of questions is determined completely at random, if the occurrence
of duplicated questions, the non-attendance of members, and the speed of debates were not influenced
by any of the members present, it should be expected that there would be no significant differences
between the averages of any of the observable characteristics across the two groups.
Results in Table 2 show, however, that there are statistically significant differences between the two
groups in terms of observable characteristics. Among those questions which are reached during the
debate and therefore receive oral answers, there is a higher proportion of opposition party members.
Furthermore, among the questions that are reached, there is a higher proportion of questions posed by
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and difference-in-means tests for the treatment and control groups across
the entire dataset. Taking each question asked as a separate data point, the treatment group includes all
questions asked in Parliament (N = 25521), whereas the control group includes all questions submitted,
but not reached during the debate (N = 28934).
Answered questions Unanswered questions Difference
Conservative Party 0.354 0.330 0.0243∗∗
(3.144)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.114 0.103 0.0113∗∗
(3.034)
Other party, excluding Labour 0.0322 0.0336 -0.00138
(-0.522)
Changed party 0.0139 0.0108 0.00309
(1.549)
Ministerial position 0.458 0.422 0.0364∗∗∗
(4.849)
Age 53.34 52.88 0.461∗∗∗
(3.333)
Age squared 2924.0 2874.2 49.87∗∗∗
(3.335)
Years service 11.46 10.86 0.601∗∗∗
(4.107)
Years service squared 201.9 184.9 17.00∗∗
(3.079)
Female 0.185 0.183 0.00189
(0.355)
Observations 54455
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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members who have held a ministerial position (defined as a position on the government or opposition
front-benches in the House of Commons). Finally, questions in the treatment group are asked on average
by older members, and members who have held office for a longer period of time.
Taken as a whole, Table 2 shows statistically significant differences on many of the observable char-
acteristics between the treatment and control groups, despite the fact that questions are drawn and
ordered completely at random.
3.2.2 The Cause of Observed Endogeneity
Given that it is not the main focus of this study, detailed discussions of the reasons behind these
observed differences between the treatment and control groups are omitted. In short, results point to
the speed at which the debates progress being endogenously determined as the main cause of the non-
random allocation to treatment. The matched sampling approach that will be introduced in Section 4
is found to be effective in eradicating these differences, while simultaneously ensuring that each debate
contributes an equal number of questions to the treatment and control groups in the regressions that
follow.
Specifically, results point to the Speaker being more likely to conduct debates in such a way as to admit
questions from members representing opposition parties, and who have higher levels of authority. This is
the first time that such a natural experiment has been used to report such a finding, and warrants further
attention elsewhere. The focus of the rest of this paper, however, will be to devise an estimation approach
which addresses this non-random element in the determination of which parliamentary questions receive
an oral answer.
4 Ordinary Least Squares Based on Matched Sampling
To control for the observed non-randomness in determining which parliamentary questions receive oral
answers in the UK House of Commons, a method will be used which drops those observations most likely
to be allocated to the treatment or control group in a non-random way. Observations are also dropped
in such a way that each debate is equally represented in the treatment and control groups. As such,
this method also simultaneously controls for the influence that specific debates might have on outcomes,
by ensuring that any such effects influence the treatment and control groups in equal measure. This
method is akin to a matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); LaLonde (1986); Heckman et al.
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(1998); Angrist and Lavy (2001); A. Smith and E. Todd (2005); Diamond and Sekhon (2012)), where
questions in the treatment group are matched with a corresponding question in the control group, based
on the debate for which they were submitted. As with a simple matching estimator, each observation
that received the treatment (having a question answered in this case) is effectively compared to a single
counterpart that did not receive the treatment (an unanswered question), which is deemed comparable
on the basis of some observed characteristic, which in this case is the debate for which the questions were
submitted. Ho et al. (2007) propose a similar approach as a means for reducing a model’s dependence on
the parametric assumptions that are made after the data has been “preprocessed” in this way, following
related work by Rubin (1973) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984).
4.1 Matched Sampling Methodology
Questions where the member was not present at the debate (1932 questions, or 3.5% of the dataset), and
duplicated questions (1451 questions, or 2.7% of the dataset) are not subject to the same randomization
process as other questions, so both types of question are removed from the dataset for the results reported
in this section.
After removing such cases, the matched sampling method involves dropping observations whenever
there are an unequal number of questions in the treatment and control group for a given debate. To
simultaneously solve the problem of non-random allocation to the treatment and control groups, through
endogeneity in the speed at which the debate is conducted, the questions chosen to be dropped are those
closest to the cutoff point (at which the debate ended), as these are seen as the most likely to be subject
to non-random allocation to treatment or control.
This can be shown more formally as follows:
• i represents the set of members
• d represents the set of debates
• aidt is a binary variable indicating whether the question asked in debate d by member i received an
oral answer
Let nid represent the number at which the question of member i is drawn to be asked in the debate.
Furthermore, let Nd represent the total number of questions listed on the Order Paper for the debate.
This is a subset of the total number of questions submitted for the debate (regardless of whether they
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Figure 2: Two example debates, one where more than half the questions are answered (nA > NA/2), and
another where less than half are answered (nB < NB/2)
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made it onto the Order Paper), itself denoted Sd. Finally, let nd represent the number assigned to the
last question reached in debate d, i.e. the ‘cutoff’ point.
Now you have:
aidt =

1 if nid ≤ nd
0 otherwise
Now, if nd > Nd/2, this means that more than half of the questions listed for answer in debate d
received an oral answer. In such cases, the last questions from the treatment group will be dropped
from the analysis. More specifically, any question such that Nd − nd < nid ≤ nd will be dropped from
the sample if nd > Nd/2.
Conversely, if less than half of the questions listed on the Order Paper for debate d received an oral
answer (nd < Nd/2), then the first questions from the control group will be dropped from the analysis.
In particular, any question such that nd < nid ≤ Nd − nd will be dropped from the sample if nd < Nd/2.
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows the questions listed on the Order Paper for two debates, one which
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proceeds fast (Debate A), and another which proceeds slowly (Debate B).
Debate A in Figure 2 shows the case where more than half of the questions listed on the Order Paper
are reached during the debate (7 of the 10 questions listed, illustrated as clear boxes). If the number
of questions answered in such debates is non-random (as was shown to be the case in Section 4), the
questions which are likely to have particular (non-random) characteristics, are those that were reached
only because the debate proceeded quickly (questions 4 to 7 in this case). The questions at the start of
the debate would have been reached anyway, and those at the end were not reached, even though the
debate proceeded quickly. In debates where more than half of the questions are reached, the treatment
group is taken as the first questions in the debate, up to the number of questions which matches the
size of the control group (questions 1 to 3 in Debate A).
In Debate B in Figure 2, less than half of the questions are reached during the debate itself, so in this
case the control group is larger. In such cases, any non-randomness in the speed at which the debate is
conducted is likely to have resulted in fewer questions being answered than would otherwise have been
the case. This means that the questions most likely to be non-random are those appearing immediately
after the cutoff at which the debate ended. Again, to ensure equal numbers in the treatment and control
groups, some observations must be dropped, and in this case, it is questions immediately after the cutoff
which are removed.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics Under Matched Sampling
Before reporting the results of the ordinary least squares estimator based on the matched sample, it is
necessary to consider whether the process of dropping observations had any effect on the comparability
of the treatment and control groups, by looking at the descriptive statistics of the two groups in terms
of observable characteristics of members.
Previously in Section 4, when looking at the dataset as a whole, it was shown that there were
statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups. In particular, the questions
that were reached during the debates were on average asked more often by opposition members, with a
higher average age, ministerial status, and length of parliamentary service.
Table 3 shows that the process of dropping observations has resulted in the treatment and control
groups becoming far more comparable, with no statistically significant differences reported between any
of the observable characteristics of the members asking questions in either group.
This supports the claim that it is those questions closest to the cutoff which are the cause of the
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and difference-in-means tests for the treatment and control groups with
both groups equivalently distributed across debates. Taking each question asked as a separate data
point, the treatment group includes all questions asked in Parliament (N = 17193), whereas the control
group includes all questions submitted, but not reached during the debate (N = 17193).
Answered questions Unanswered questions Difference
Conservative Party 0.335 0.341 -0.00535
(-0.986)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.111 0.106 0.00465
(1.437)
Other party, excluding Labour 0.0332 0.0328 0.000349
(0.178)
Changed party 0.0132 0.0117 0.00145
(1.230)
Ministerial position 0.438 0.436 0.00279
(0.493)
Age 52.98 53.05 -0.0718
(-0.727)
Age squared 2885.5 2892.9 -7.410
(-0.696)
Years service 11.03 11.03 0.00151
(0.0158)
Years service squared 190.5 189.4 1.109
(0.305)
Female 0.187 0.186 0.000582
(0.131)
Observations 34386
Standard errors clustered at member level
t-statistics reported in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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statistically significant differences between the two groups that were found previously when considering
the entire sample. The matched sampling approach used here is effective in eradicating those differences
because it disproportionately removes the questions closest to the cutoff, which are the source of the
bias.
4.3 Estimation Based on the Matched Sample
The first key difference between the following estimation strategy and the OLS framework reported
in Section 2 is that in this case each observation corresponds to a question, as opposed to a member.
The second is that in this specification, comparisons are made between members who successfully and
unsuccessfully answered questions, so the control group is now exclusively made up of members whose
questions were listed on the Order Paper, but were not asked. Members who had no questions listed
on the Order Paper during a parliamentary term do not contribute to the findings. By contrast, in the
first specification, non-ministerial members who asked no questions during the parliament were counted
as zeros.
Once the dataset has been reduced in this way, the effect of a question being asked as opposed to
receiving a written answer is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) on the remaining observations.
Formally:
• t = 1, . . . , T represents the set of elections.
• yidt is a binary variable reflecting the reelection outcome of a member i in election t, who asked a
question in debate d (dependent variable).
• qidt is a binary variable indicating whether the question of member i in debate d received an oral
answer (1), or was not reached and thus received a written answer (0).
• Xidt is a set of control variables associated with member i at the time of debate d.
• Didt is a set of dummy variables capturing debate fixed effects.
• Cidt is a set of dummy variables capturing constituency fixed effects.
Using these definitions, this model can be written as:
yidt = β0 + β1qidt + β2Xidt + β3Didt + β4Cidt + idt
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In this specification, given that a member i had a question selected to be placed on the Order Paper in
debate d, the probability that the question was answered is 0.5, independent of any characteristics of the
member asking the question, the constituency they represent, or the debate for which the question was
submitted. This means that any effect from qidt on the probability of reelection can be attributed to qidt
itself, as opposed to any other characteristics (observed or otherwise) associated with the observation.
Some controls are still included in the estimated regressions, however, given that they improve the
precision of the findings. Standard errors will once again be clustered at the member level in all the
results that follow.
Reducing the dataset as outlined above, but without any further controls, Table 4 shows that a
question being reached in the debate increases the probability that the member who asked the question
was reelected in the following election by 0.42 percentage points over another member, whose question
was on the Order Paper but was not answered (Column 1). This effect is found to be far from significant
at the 5% level, however, with a t-statistic of 0.98.
The subsequent two columns (Column 2 and Column 3) each include further control variables, first for
party affiliation, and next for various other member characteristics. The adjusted-R2 value jumps from
zero to 0.18 after including these variables. The coefficient of interest remains close to 0.004, implying
that among the answered questions the members who posed the questions have a probability of being
reelected that is 0.40 percentage points higher than it would have been had their question appeared on
the Order Paper, but too far down the list to receive an oral answer.
After including a set of dummy variables for each of the constituencies in the sample (Column 4),
the adjusted-R2 jumps to 0.59. It is unsurprising that the inclusion of variables which control for the
constituency represented by each member explains a large part of the variation in reelection probabilities,
given the strength of geographical voting norms which exist among the UK electorate. The coefficient
of interest remains fairly constant at just over 0.004, but is not found to be statistically significant at
the 5% level, with a t-statistic of 1.49.
The inclusion of a set of dummy variables controlling for debate-specific effects has very little effect on
the adjusted-R2 (Column 5). This in unsurprising, given that the matched sampling approach used here
to remove those questions most likely to have been allocated to treatment or control in a non-random
way, also implies that each debate is equally represented in the treatment and control groups. The
effects of individual debates is therefore already being controlled for through the model specification,
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Table 4: Linear probability models with reelection at the forthcoming election as the dependent variable
(mean = 0.823, standard deviation = 0.381), based on the subsample of the dataset which ensures that
the distribution of debates is equivalent across the treatment and control groups. The treatment group
includes questions reached in the debate, and control group includes all questions further down the
Order Paper and therefore not asked (N = 17193 in both cases).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Question asked 0.00419 0.00447 0.00396 0.00428 0.00421
(0.98) (1.06) (0.99) (1.49) (1.48)
Conservative Party 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0396 0.316∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(3.52) (1.20) (3.86) (4.27)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0690 -0.0171 0.434∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(1.85) (-0.37) (2.96) (3.34)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.313∗∗∗ -0.247∗ -0.110 -0.0376
(-3.46) (-2.55) (-0.57) (-0.20)
Changed party -0.240 -0.145 -0.151
(-1.60) (-0.65) (-0.74)
Ministerial position 0.0680∗ -0.0229 0.0317
(2.03) (-0.41) (0.57)
Age 0.0481∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(3.11) (5.45) (5.44)
Age squared -0.000534∗∗∗ -0.00152∗∗∗ -0.00140∗∗∗
(-3.44) (-6.02) (-6.02)
Years service -0.0163∗∗ -0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0348∗∗∗
(-2.78) (-4.11) (-3.54)
Years service squared 0.000305 0.000684∗∗ 0.000539∗
(1.80) (2.67) (2.10)
Female -0.0830∗∗ -0.0686 -0.0295
(-2.95) (-0.79) (-0.36)
Constituency dummies No No No Yes Yes
Debate dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 34386 34386 34386 34386 34386
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.040 0.176 0.586 0.593
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all parliamentary questions over the parliamentary term, except the first few months of 1997 (see previous footnote)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 3: Answered questions minus unanswered questions for each member in each electoral term (mean
= -2.06, standard deviation = 11.05)
which means that the inclusion of debate-fixed effects adds little to the explanatory power of the model.
4.4 Interpretation of Findings
Results from this adapted matched sampling model show that after controlling for member characteris-
tics, as well as fixed effects associated with constituencies and debates, the effect of having a question
answered, as opposed to being placed on the Order Paper, but not being reached and therefore remaining
unanswered, is to increase the member’s probability of reelection by 0.42 percentage points.
The control group here consists of questions listed on the Order Paper which did not receive an oral
answer. When interpreting these reported findings, it is therefore the difference between the number of
answered and unanswered questions which is of interest. In this sense, the most successful member in the
dataset over the course of an electoral term had 174 questions answered, compared with 94 unanswered,
implying a difference of +80 questions. Conversely, the most unsuccessful member only had 35 questions
answered, compared with 100 questions unanswered, implying a difference of -65 questions. Figure 3
plots all such differences across all members and all electoral terms.
The standard deviation associated with the number of answered minus unanswered questions across
all the members is 11.05 questions. A coefficient of 0.004 therefore implies that a member who has a
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number of answered minus unanswered questions one standard deviation higher than another member
should expect to have their chances of reelection increased by 4.6 percentage points.
5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
5.1 The Complete Dataset
Given that the method employed in Section 4 involves dropping some observations, it is informative to
consider whether the results would have been affected if the dataset had not been reduced in this way.
Results in Table 4 showed a positive relationship between having questions answered as opposed to
unanswered, although the effect was not found to be statistically significant at the 5% level. It is possible
to run a similar analysis, but without dropping observations in the same way. These specifications rely
on a set of dummy variables capturing debate fixed effects to control for the effects of different debates.
However, the benefits from the larger dataset come at the price of including those observations deemed
most likely to be allocated to the treatment or control group in a non-random way.
For the sake of brevity, the results are left to the Appendix, where Table 5 reports the results of
similar regressions as those in Table 4, but based on the entire dataset. In short, these specifications
show that the results reported in Table 4 are not reliant on the use of the matched sampling approach,
and are equally evident when considering the dataset as a whole. Once all control variables are included
in the specification, questions that receive an oral answer are found to be asked by members who are
0.40 percentage points more likely to be reelected, as opposed to those questions that appeared on the
Order Paper but were not asked. This effect is roughly equivalent to the one found when the dataset
was reduced under the previous matched sampling approach. Furthermore, owing to the fact that this
finding is based on a larger sample size, this result is found to be statistically significant at the 10%
level, with a t-statistic of 1.69.
5.2 Intention-to-Treat Specifications
An alternative method for which results are robust to any potential non-randomness in the selection
of questions to receive an oral answer is to use an ‘intention-to-treat’ (ITT) specification. Again, this
specification is based on the full dataset where each observation corresponds to a parliamentary question.
If a question appears towards the top of the Order Paper (a ‘low-numbered’ question), it is taken
as part of the treatment group in this model, whereas any question further down the Order Paper
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is placed in the control group (a ‘high-numbered question’). Across all the debates recorded in the
dataset, 47% of the questions listed on the Order Paper receive oral answers. In this ITT analysis, the
first 47% of questions in each debate are therefore counted as ‘low-numbered’, with all the remaining
questions marked as ‘high-numbered’. Given that the position of a question on the Order Paper cannot
be influenced by any of the participants in the debate, this allocation is truly exogenous.
Results listed in Table 6 in the Appendix show a consistently positive effect from having a ‘low-
numbered’ question on the Order Paper, as opposed to a ‘high-numbered’ question. The effect is
found to be smaller effect than the estimated effect from Tables 4 and 5 of actually having a question
answered, however. With all controls included, questions that are assigned a low number on the Order
Paper are found to be asked by members who are 0.16 percentage points more likely to be reelected.
While these results are far from statistically significant, they continue to suggest a positive relationship
between members’ randomly allocated position on the Order Paper and their subsequent probability of
reelection.
5.3 The Ordinary Least Squares Specification Based on the Reduced Sample
A final robustness check involves running the basic ordinary least squares specification proposed in
Section 2 but using the reduced dataset from the matched sampling approach. The results are again
left to the Appendix (Table 7), and show a slightly larger positive effect effect than was found originally
when counting all questions from the entire sample. Specifically, once all controls are included, the act of
asking an extra parliamentary question is found to increase a member’s probability of reelection by 0.32
percentage points, whereas the effect was estimated as 0.31 percentage points in Section 2. Furthermore,
this effect is again found to be statistically significant at the 5% level, with an associated t-statistic of
2.11.
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed to test whether the asking of oral parliamentary questions in the House Of Commons
increases a member’s probability of being reelected to Parliament in the following election.
The way in which constituents choose their political representatives is of great interest to social scien-
tists. Economists should be particularly interested in the degree to which legislators have an incentive to
partake in day-to-day parliamentary business. The relationship between a political representative and
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their constituents can be thought of in a principal-agent setting, where constituents observe some pro-
portion (or signal) of the work of their representative over a parliamentary term before choosing whether
to reelect them for the following term. A crucial part of this relationship is whether constituents can be
shown to reward parliamentary activity in their voting behavior.
While many previous studies have considered the effect of legislator behavior on election outcomes,
none have considered the impact of asking parliamentary questions on reelection chances. A key reason
for this is that members who ask many parliamentary questions are likely to have particular charac-
teristics, which may be unobservable. A study which does not address this issue would not be able
to separate the effect of members’ parliamentary activity from the effect of these unobservable charac-
teristics on reelection outcomes. By exploiting a natural experiment within the institutional structure
of the House of Commons, this paper is able to rule out the impact of unobservable characteristics by
assuming them to be equally distributed among the treatment and control groups, and therefore makes
a valuable contribution to the understanding of the relationship in question.
The identification strategy used to answer this question relied on the randomized way in which
parliamentary questions are ordered, which in turn affects their probability of receiving an oral answer.
In particular, members wishing to ask a parliamentary question are invited to submit their questions
ahead of the debate. Once submitted, a random ballot is used to determine which of these questions
appear on the Order Paper, and the order in which they will be answered. This ballot has a direct effect
on which questions receive an oral answer, because time constraints usually dictate that only the first
questions listed on the Order Paper will be reached during the time allotted to the debate.
A basic ordinary least squares specification counting the number of answered and unanswered ques-
tions for each MP over each parliamentary term revealed that after controlling for the number of unan-
swered questions, members with a higher number of answered questions were more likely to be reelected
in the following election.
While the ordering of questions is determined at random, this finding relies on the idea that each
time a member’s question appears on the Order Paper, there is an equal (or at least exogenous) chance
that their question receives an oral answer. One way in which this assumption could potentially be
violated would be if any of the debate participants, including the Speaker, exerted some control over the
speed at which debates progressed, and therefore the number of questions that received an oral answer
in debates.
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In fact it has been shown that there exist some statistically significant differences between the ob-
servable characteristics of the members whose questions receive an oral answer, and those members
whose questions are selected to be placed on the Order Paper for debates, but are not reached, and
therefore receive written answers. Further analysis, omitted from these results, has been conducted into
the reasons behind these differences. Results suggest that the influence of the Speaker plays a key role.
To account for this non-random element to whether questions are answered, a matched sampling
approach was adopted, which dropped those observations most likely to have been allocated to the
treatment or control group in a non-random way. The method also ensures that debates are equally
distributed across the treatment and control groups, which implies that once a member’s question is
listed on the Order Paper, it has a probability of being answered of 0.5. By comparing means across
the same set of observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups (answered and
unanswered questions), it was shown that this matched sampling approach was successful in eliminating
the statistically significant differences between the two parts of the sample. Using this reduced sample, it
was possible to estimate the effect on reelection probability of having a question answered in Parliament,
as opposed to submitting a question which was not reached during the debate (and instead received a
written answer).
Results again showed a positive relationship between having questions answered in Parliament, and
the probability of reelection, of the same order of magnitude as was found under the basic ordinary least
squares estimation. To ensure that this positive result was not caused by reducing the sample in this
way, a similar analysis was conducted using the entire dataset, and found the results unchanged. While
the size of the effect was reduced under an intention-to-treat (ITT) specification, the results remained
positive under all combinations of control variables.
This paper says nothing about the paths of such influence and this could be a topic for future
research. While debates are televised, it seems implausible to imagine that a substantial proportion of
the electorate would watch these debates directly. It seems more likely that the media has an important
role to play, for example through local newspapers reporting the actions of legislators at the national
level. Personal networks within the constituency could also play an important role. As an example, a
constituent may raise a very specific concern to their local MP, who might then choose to pursue the
issue at the national level by posing the question directly to the minister responsible. In such cases,
while the issue itself may be narrow and therefore not deemed newsworthy, other constituents who hear
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of this episode via word-of-mouth may be heartened by the legislator’s willingness to pursue the issue.
Such sentiments could then be reflected in election outcomes.
To summarize, the motivation of this paper was to exploit a natural experiment brought about by the
institutional structure in the House of Commons, to determine whether members who ask parliamentary
questions are more likely to be reelected by their constituents. Initial results found this to be the case,
and significantly so, but faced the potential criticism that the randomization process could potentially
be undermined. A matched sampling approach was used to reduce the dataset to those observations
least likely to have been affected by any non-random allocation to the treatment or control group. This
was shown to result in a dataset where the treatment and control groups were comparable in terms of all
observable characteristics, as should be expected under a randomization. Results based on this reduced
sample were found to support the original finding.
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Table 5: Regressions controlling for debate fixed effects, counting each question (answered or unanswered)
as an observation, based on the whole sample. The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating
whether the member asking the question was reelected in the following election, with mean = 0.820 and
standard deviation = 0.384.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Question asked -0.0194∗∗ 0.00615 0.00512 0.00486 0.00396
(-3.01) (1.72) (1.46) (1.46) (1.69)
Conservative Party 0.119∗∗∗ 0.0496 0.342∗∗∗
(4.26) (1.46) (3.92)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0949∗ -0.0104 0.411∗∗
(2.53) (-0.23) (2.76)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.303∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗ -0.0593
(-3.62) (-2.70) (-0.33)
Changed party -0.236 -0.162
(-1.87) (-0.81)
Ministerial position 0.0907∗∗ 0.0294
(2.80) (0.53)
Age 0.0422∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(2.92) (5.58)
Age squared -0.000471∗∗ -0.00143∗∗∗
(-3.26) (-6.17)
Years service -0.0104 -0.0365∗∗∗
(-1.79) (-3.68)
Years service squared 0.000150 0.000599∗
(0.88) (2.34)
Female -0.0695∗∗ -0.0139
(-2.59) (-0.17)
Debate dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 54455 54455 54455 54455 54455
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.054 0.101 0.209 0.598
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Linear probability models estimating the effect of having a question high up the Order Paper
(likely to be answered), as opposed to a question lower down the Order Paper (unlikely to be answered)
on the probability of reelection. This represents an ‘intention-to-treat’ (ITT) model, where reelection is
captured by a binary variable, with mean = 0.820, standard deviation = 0.384.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Low-numbered question 0.00559 0.00526 0.00203 0.00186 0.00163
(1.55) (1.49) (0.64) (0.82) (0.74)
Conservative Party 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0417 0.292∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(3.52) (1.28) (3.59) (3.92)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0690 -0.0187 0.367∗ 0.411∗∗
(1.74) (-0.39) (2.44) (2.76)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.323∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗ -0.124 -0.0593
(-3.68) (-2.66) (-0.66) (-0.33)
Changed party -0.255 -0.154 -0.162
(-1.80) (-0.72) (-0.81)
Ministerial position 0.0672∗ -0.0151 0.0295
(2.03) (-0.27) (0.53)
Age 0.0477∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(3.05) (5.59) (5.58)
Age squared -0.000530∗∗∗ -0.00154∗∗∗ -0.00143∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-6.16) (-6.17)
Years service -0.0162∗∗ -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗
(-2.74) (-4.27) (-3.68)
Years service squared 0.000298 0.000729∗∗ 0.000600∗
(1.73) (2.91) (2.34)
Female -0.0851∗∗ -0.0487 -0.0138
(-2.98) (-0.58) (-0.17)
Constituency dummies No No No Yes Yes
Debate dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 54455 54455 54455 54455 54455
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.042 0.177 0.593 0.598
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all parliamentary questions over the parliamentary term, except the first few months of 1997 (see previous footnote)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Linear probability models estimating the effect of having an extra question answered in the
House of Commons on a member’s probability of reelection (mean = 0.752, standard deviation = 0.432).
Estimates here are based on the dataset which counts only those questions which were used under the
matched sampling approach.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected Reelected
Total answered questions -0.00213∗ 0.00182 0.00155 0.00143 0.00319∗
(-2.29) (1.70) (1.46) (1.47) (2.16)
Total unanswered questions 0.00482∗∗∗ 0.00102 0.000752 0.0000495 -0.00136
(6.01) (1.10) (0.82) (0.05) (-0.90)
Conservative Party 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(4.56) (2.90) (3.15)
Liberal Democrat Party 0.0367 -0.0277 0.116
(1.03) (-0.76) (0.77)
Other party, excluding Labour -0.108∗ -0.0882 -0.0610
(-2.01) (-1.68) (-0.38)
Changed party -0.317∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.197
(-3.40) (-2.77) (-1.27)
Ministerial position 0.0791∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(3.25) (3.50)
Age 0.0340∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(2.90) (3.97)
Age squared -0.000389∗∗∗ -0.000839∗∗∗
(-3.41) (-4.61)
Years service -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗
(-4.89) (-6.35)
Years service squared 0.000532∗∗∗ 0.000858∗∗∗
(3.68) (4.24)
Female -0.0831∗∗ -0.0168
(-3.26) (-0.23)
Election dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.054 0.083 0.174 0.289
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at member level
Dataset includes all parliamentary questions over the parliamentary term, except the first few months of 1997 (see previous footnote)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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